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Abstract 
In 1993, Iowa obtained a waiver to enact many of the key provisions of Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in its welfare assistance and initiated the Iowa 
Family Investment Program (FIP). We use Iowa state administrative data for the period 
1993-95 and study why some low-income households successfully leave public 
assistance while others who leave later return. We focus on those who were active in FIP 
at the time of the program reforms. The research explores the role of employment, 
earnings, and other support such as the Food Stamp Program (FSP) and child support for 
recipients who leave FIP. Geographic (metro and nonmetro) differences are of specific 
interest. Reasons for recidivism are examined over time, with specific attention to local 
labor market conditions and factors that differentiate areas by degree of rural/metro 
location (various classifications). The analysis provides evidence on the effects of 
programmatic changes in Iowas welfare programs. Among those active in FIP in all 
months of the two-year period, employment increased. Multivariate analysis of 
recidivism shows that during the first two quarters, those in nonmetro areas were more 
likely to return to FIP; however, after this initial period, the risk of return was very 
similar in the two areas. The analysis provides specific results for better understanding of 
the impact of recent reforms on low-income households in a state that is relatively rural. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
LOCATION AND THE LOW INCOME EXPERIENCE: 
ANALYSES OF PROGRAM DYNAMICS 
IN THE IOWA FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM 
 
Introduction 
In 1993, the State of Iowa, through waivers, implemented reforms creating the 
Family Investment Program (FIP), a program similar to Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) created under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). FIPs goals of helping program recipients leave poverty 
and become self-supporting parallel the intent of TANF and PRWORA (Holcomb et al., 
1998; Iowa Department of Human Services, 1996). FIP merged and coordinated several 
existing programs and tied support for job training, education, child care, and 
transportation more directly to income transfers. Iowa has had to change FIP very little to 
meet current federal guidelines. Thus, Iowa provides over six years of experience under a 
program with rules and incentives similar to those instituted nationwide only recently. 
The changes in welfare policies and programs created by the PRWORA of 1996 
raise questions about how rural families who have received assistance are faring as work 
requirements and time limits on cash assistance are implemented. Whether rural welfare 
recipients face a more difficult transition from welfare to sustained employment given the 
challenges facing some rural areas is not well understood. 
This paper examines the dynamics of welfare participation during the pre-TANF 
period of Iowas reform (199395). Iowa had received a waiver to enact many of the key 
provisions of TANF during this period, including encouragement of recipients to enter 
job training and the labor market. The analyses make use of a unique data set comprised 
of linked state administrative records. These data are ideal for longitudinal analyses 
because key variables are available on a monthly basis. The data also allow us to track 
location and change in location of the FIP households. The research has the specific 
objective of determining how programmatic, demographic, and macroeconomic factors 
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relate to recidivism among program participants. Reasons for recidivism are examined 
over time, with specific attention to the local labor market conditions and by degree of 
metro/nonmetro location (various classifications). 
In the next section, we provide background to Iowas welfare program, review 
previous research and discuss the aspects of geographic differences that may influence 
the FIP experience. In section three, we outline the main features of the Iowa 
administrative data used here. We also discuss the benefits and drawbacks of using 
administrative data for research purposes. Section four provides descriptive analyses of 
the dynamics of FIP participation. In section five, we employ a semiparametric duration 
model and examine the distribution of the first exit spells and incidence of recidivism. 
The semiparametric approach has the advantage of not requiring distributional 
assumptions on the duration of the exit spells. We conclude the paper by drawing several 
policy implications from our findings. 
 
Background 
Throughout the 1990s rural states enjoyed the benefits of a healthy economy. In 
Iowa in the latter half of this decade, for example, the statewide unemployment rate 
remained well below the national rate. In 1999, 95 of the 99 Iowa counties had 
unemployment rates below the national mark of 4.1 percent. Iowas economic success, 
however, has had an uneven geographic distribution. County level unemployment rates in 
Iowa in 1999 ranged from 1.7 percent (Warren County) to 4.5 percent (Butler County), 
with all but one of the seven counties having the highest unemployment rates being 
predominately rural counties (Iowa Department of Workforce Development, 2000). In the 
more rural counties, manufacturing jobs have absorbed many of the numbers of those 
leaving farming, however since 1993, most of Iowas population growth has been in the 
states 10 metropolitan counties (Eathington, Swenson, and Otto, 2000). 
During the 1990s, caseloads in Iowa for the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC)/FIP and the Food Stamp Program (FSP) both peaked around the time 
of the implementation of the FIP waivers. Since early 1994, the caseloads for both 
programs have declined relatively steadily (see Figure 1). Interestingly, the proportion of 
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cases from metro versus nonmetro counties has been about the same for AFDC/FIP and 
FSP during this decade; about one-half of the cases for each program came from the 10 
metro counties while the other one-half came from the 89 nonmetro counties. Stated 
another way, while rural unemployment rates in Iowa remain generally higher than metro 
rates, both nonmetro and metro counties alike have seen a reduction in assistance 
program participation. 
Most studies of former welfare recipients have found that between one-half and 
three-quarters of parents are employed shortly after they leave the rolls (see Parrott, 
1998). However, wages are low, typically below $8 per hour and often below $6 per 
hour. As a result, studies measuring earnings over three-month periods find earnings 
levels well below poverty. 
Much of the policy debate over welfare reform has centered on the plight of poor 
urban families. While poverty has become more urbanized over the past several decades, 
most poor and welfare-recipient families live outside of central cities, and many live 
outside of metropolitan areas altogether. As indicated by Food Stamp, TANF, and 
Medicaid caseload patterns, welfare reform appears to have distinct geographic 
components (Goetz and Freshwater 1997). Some evidence suggests that rural workers 
may face substantially greater barriers than urban workers to being fully employed and 
moving to economic self-sufficiency. In nonmetropolitan areas, poor families are already 
more likely to be working, and more likely to be underemployed (working part-time, 
earning low wages, or unemployed), compared to poor families in metro areas (Findeis 
and Jensen, 1998). In Iowa, average nonfarm earnings in rural counties are below those in 
metropolitan and other counties. In manufacturing, average rural manufacturing earnings 
are much below urban and metro manufacturing levels at 68 percent of national levels; in 
the services sector, rural earnings were 49 percent of the U.S. average (Eathington, 
Swenson, and Otto, 2000). 
The majority of the early literature on welfare participation finds that greater 
nonwage income, higher wage rates, more years of schooling, fewer children, good 
health, and being white are related to lower participation rates and higher exit rates. 
Moreover, these studies also show the existence of negative duration dependence that 
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occurs when the exit rate falls as the duration of the welfare spell lengthens, or reentry 
rates fall, the longer the spell off of assistance. Moffitt (1992) reviews the concepts and 
measures of welfare dependence presented in this early literature. He finds that the most 
common definition of welfare dependence focuses on the length of a single welfare spell; 
this measure does not consider the high reentry (recidivism) rates among welfare 
recipients. 
Important determinants of recidivism identified in the literature include having fewer 
years of education, not being married, and having little job experience (Sandefur and 
Cook, 1997; Brandon, 1995). Caos (1996) analyses indicate that initial welfare 
dependency and recidivism are correlated with the recipients age, years of education, 
marital status, ethnic origin, and region. 
Born et al. (1998) provide preliminary analyses of administrative data from the 
Maryland Family Investment Program. Nearly 20 percent of the cases they examined 
were reopened within the first three to six months post-exit. Reentry rates were lowest 
among women who exited for employment reasons. Born et al. also find that women 
whose exits were short-lived tended to have younger children than those women who 
managed to stay off of the program. Reidy (1998) examines the role of noncash benefits 
for those leaving AFDC. One result is that those who leave AFDC but continue to claim 
noncash benefits (including FSP) are more likely to return to AFDC than others who 
leave both AFDC and other noncash benefit programs at the same time. 
The limited information to date on differences between rural and urban areas (e.g., 
Porterfield 1998) shows that those in urban areas have longer spells on welfare compared 
to others in rural, or smaller urban locations. Differences in labor market opportunities, 
the household and individual characteristics of those in the two areas (including human 
capital differences), and costs of working (i.e., logistics of transportation, or child care 
services) are possible sources of differences. The shorter spells on welfare in rural areas 
may also be due to lack of program information and stigma attached to public assistance 
(Porterfield, 1998). Also, Porterfield found that rural families are more likely to enter 
welfare due to decreases in earnings or income (compared with urban families), but urban 
families were more likely to exit welfare through earnings or income increases. 
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A significant difference between metro and nonmetro areas may lie in the labor 
market and job opportunities. Davis, Connolly and Weber (1999) point to the spatial 
mismatch that has occurred as seekers of jobs in small markets have less success in 
obtaining jobs, and employers in other markets have a hard time finding the types of 
employees they seek. The greater prevalence of underemployment in nonmetro areas, 
typified by low wage employment, involuntary part-time work, or discouraged 
workers, may explain part of the inconsistency between relatively low unemployment 
rates in many areas and continued low incomes (Findeis and Jensen, 1998). 
The current study examines the effects and outcomes of an assistance program quite 
similar to the TANF programs that have been established in many states. The early 
experiences with FIP in Iowa allow examination of the experiences of individuals and 
families who left FIP in the two-year period following its introduction. We study why 
some low-income households successfully leave public assistance while others who leave 
later return. We examine a specific set of families who were enrolled and active in FIP at 
the time of the newly enacted changes in the system. 
 
Data 
Iowa was one of the early states to link administrative data across programs to 
support program administration and policy analysis. In 1995, a project was designed to 
develop administrative data systems for research purposes. The product of this effort was 
a 3-year (April 1993 to March 1996) longitudinal data file that matches and merges FIP, 
Medicaid, the FSP, child support, and quarterly earnings records for all FIP recipients 
during this period. FIP, food stamps, and Medicaid represent the key assistance programs 
for low-income families; child support and earnings are the key sources of nonpublic 
assistance income. These data are specific as to amounts (e.g., program benefits, child 
support received, and earnings) and dates (e.g., program exit and reentry) and are 
preferred over survey data for this reason; these data are not subject to problems related 
to respondent recall and respondent bias. Data are linked for all FIP recipients in April 
1993. Observations (cases) are added to the file as they enter FIP; cases are followed 
throughout the data period, even after exiting FIP. 
12  /  Jensen, Keng, and Garasky 
We supplement the administrative data file in two ways. First, we classify each 
county as being metro (counties in metro area), urban (nonmetro counties with urban 
population of 20,000 or more), rural adjacent (counties with urban population of 2,500 to 
19,999 or rural counties, adjacent to a metro area), or rural non-adjacent (Butler and 
Beale, 1994). The last three categories can be combined into a nonmetro group. Second, 
we merge monthly county unemployment rates and county income per capita to account 
for the effect of local economic conditions in our analyses. Monthly county 
unemployment rates are available from Iowa Workforce Development. 
We create a two-year panel data set, beginning October 1993, the start of the FIP 
program, and ending September 1995. All cases identified as receiving FIP benefits in 
October 1993 (n=38,632) are included in the panel. No samples are drawn for these 
analyses. We observe 22,080 FIP exits among these cases, where exit is defined as being 
inactive (i.e., no benefits) for two months in a row. The total number of observations for 
the empirical analyses is reduced to 32,309 after deleting cases with missing information 
other than educational attainment. Of these cases, there were 17,159 cases (53 percent) 
metro and 15,150 cases (47 percent) nonmetro. 
Although the Iowa linked data set includes detailed information on child support 
collections, FIP participation, and quarterly wage earnings, the household and 
demographic variables are limited. Available information includes the case heads 
educational attainment, age, marital status, ethnic origin, gender, disability status, and 
county of residence. The number of children in the household also is known. 
Unfortunately, it is not mandatory to provide educational attainment when applying 
for FIP, and about 50 percent of our observations have missing data on education. 
Comparison of the sample means of variables including and excluding observations with 
missing education fails to support the assumption that the occurrences of missing data on 
educational attainment are distributed randomly throughout the population. Because 
deleting nonrandom missing data would lead to biased estimates and a loss of 
information, we employed a multiple imputation procedure (Rubin 1987) to compensate 
for the missing educational attainment data. The multiple imputations generate 6,593 
observations (40.5 percent) with no high school degree for two years, 9,436 observations 
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(57.9 percent) with at least a high school degree for two years, and 270 observations (1.6 
percent) experiencing a change in educational attainment (receiving their high school 
degree) some time during the two-year period. 
 
Family Investment Program Participation 
How well did the families fare during the initial period of the FIP program? And, 
were there differences in the experiences of those in metro areas compared to those in 
nonmetro areas? Differences may be attributed to a number of factors, and are explored 
in this paper. First we consider the differences using tabular analysis. 
The data analyzed over the two-year period come from cases active in October 1993. 
During the data period observed, the overall FIP caseload initially increased and then fell. 
Some evidence suggests that the initial caseload increase resulted from the more generous 
FIP income disregards and the stronger support programs that were introduced in 1993 
(Fraker et al., 1998). Of the cases, 53.1 percent were in metro areas; 46.9 percent were in 
nonmetro areas. 
As shown in Table 1, about 90 percent of the FIP cases received food stamps, and, as 
expected, almost all cases included households with children. Of these cases, 46 percent 
had a single adult with child(ren) and 91 percent of the case heads were female. At the 
beginning of the period (October 1993) nonmetro cases had a lower share of households 
on the FSP. The nonmetro cases were more likely to have wage earnings and to be 
receiving child support, compared with those in metro countries. The nonmetro cases 
were also more likely to have a case-head that was married, was white, and had less than 
a high school degree compared to metro cases. 
Table 2 provides basic descriptive information comparing the FIP cases of metro and 
nonmetro areas from the beginning of the period (end of first quarter observed in 1993) to 
the end of the period (end of last quarter observed in 1995). In both metro and nonmetro 
areas, nearly half of the cases observed as active in October 1993 were active at the end 
of the two-year period (51 percent for metro and 49 percent for nonmetro areas). Food 
stamp participation also fell in a similar way, although remained a bit higher than the FIP 
participation (57 percent for metro and 53 percent for nonmetro areas). 
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The percentage of households with wage income increased in both locations. For 
metro areas, the increase was from 52 percent to 67 percent; for nonmetro areas, the 
increase was 58 percent to 72 percent. Local unemployment rates fell during the same 
time period in both areas, although in both periods, the unemployment rates were higher 
for nonmetro counties. The average wage income received by those with positive wage 
income was higher for those in nonmetro areas in both periods. These differences suggest 
differences in jobs or differences in work effort (i.e., more hours worked) by those in 
nonmetro areas. By September 1995, over 70 percent of the households in nonmetro 
areas were receiving some wage income. 
The percent of cases receiving child support also increased during this period; again, 
a relatively higher share of households in nonmetro areas received child support, 
compared to those in metro areas, and the average amount of child support received was 
higher for those living in nonmetro areas. In both areas the percent with high school 
degree increased, as did the percentage who report being married. In sum, in addition to 
improvements in the overall economy during the two-year period (as measured by 
unemployment rates), other indicators for our cohort of cases (such as average wage 
income, child support, being married, and achieving a high school degree) also improved. 
There were also differences among the nonmetro areas, as shown in Table 3. All 
three nonmetro areas (urban, rural-adjacent, and rural non-adjacent) had higher rates of 
unemployment compared to the metro areas, in both periods; the unemployment rates 
were highest in the urban (nonmetro) areas. Other indicators suggest that those in the 
urban areas did less well than those in rural areas (as measured by percent with wage 
income, average wage income, percent with child support, child support levels, and FIP 
or FSP participation). 
The measure percent living in metro counties shows the location of those who 
started in one area, and then lived in a metro area. The largest share moving to metro 
areas occurred for those who were living in rural-adjacent areas at the beginning of the 
period. Of those living in rural-adjacent areas in October 1993, 7 percent ended up in 
metro areas by September 1995. 
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We explore the mobility of cases between counties, and metro/nonmetro counties 
further. The FIP population is a relatively mobile population. For those in our data set, 
11.5 percent moved out of the original county of residence (October 1993) at least once 
during the 2-year period. In metro areas, 7.0 percent of cases moved to another county; in 
nonmetro areas, 16.6 percent of cases moved. Of those who moved from the metro area, 
nearly 21.8 percent had moved back to the original county at the end of two years 
compared to 14.6 percent of those in nonmetro counties. The evidence suggests that FIP 
recipients in metro areas are more likely to stay (or return) to their home county 
compared with nonmetro recipients. (Of course, they may move within the county and 
the metro areas have more housing and different location options. We are not able to 
evaluate this possibility. Also, there is greater availability of public housing options in 
metro areas.) 
If labor resources were fully mobile, we would expect FIP participants would move 
locations to obtain a job and that coincident with the change in location would be a 
change in FIP status. Did the moves lead to a change in FIP status? Table 4 shows the 
FIP status before and after moving to another county for metro and nonmetro movers 
during the period. The FIP status during the quarter preceding each move was compared 
to the FIP status in the first quarter in the new location (each observation is a move). As 
shown in Table 4, for those starting in metro counties, among active cases before the 
move, 69.2 percent were active in FIP after the move to a different county; 30.8 percent 
became inactive after the move. In comparison, for those starting in nonmetro counties, 
among the active cases before moving, 63.6 percent were active FIP cases after the move; 
36.4 percent became inactive. In sum, nearly two-thirds of moves to another county are 
not associated with leaving FIP in the next quarter; however, metro movers who go to 
another county are less likely to leave FIP than are those from nonmetro areas. One 
caveat to these results is that there is some lag in the system for determining eligibility 
based on previous months income. 
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We report on data for the two-year period October 1993 to September 19951 and 
looked at the amount of time (in months) the recipients were on FIP in each of the two 
years. In metro areas, 15.6 percent of recipients had relatively short spells during the first 
year (measured with up to six months on FIP in the first year); 64.3 percent remained on 
FIP during the full 12 months. The distribution of cases is similar for nonmetro areas, 
with slightly more (17.1 percent) receiving assistance six months and fewer, and 61.0 
percent staying on for the full first12 months. 
The extremes in our data are those who do not participate in FIP at all during the 
second year (long-term leavers), and those who participate in FIP all 24 months 
observed (the hard-core). The first group includes the 24.2 percent of all metro cases 
and 26.4 percent of all nonmetro cases who did not participate in FIP at all during the 
second year (0 months). The second group includes the 38.1 percent of metro cases and 
35.0 percent of nonmetro cases that remained on FIP all 24 months of the 2-year period. 
Table 5 compares differences in the groups across the four geographic locations between 
the beginning and the end months of the two-year period. 
To start, we compare those with no FIP participation in the second year across the 
four geographic areas. For this group, employment rates (receipt of wage income) were 
relatively high (ranging from 74 to 84 percent) during both years, although in all areas the 
percentage with wage income fell (had a negative growth rate). The highest rates of 
employment were in the rural adjacent areas, areas that have benefited from strong 
growth in jobs and available jobs in metro areas. For those earning wage income, the 
earnings were higher in the second year. The lowest average wage income was reported 
in metro areas. 
The percentage receiving child support increased in all geographic areas for the 
groups with no FIP participation in the second year. Average annual child support 
increased between 68 and 79 percent in all of the areas. Receipt of food stamps 
decreased: falling from levels above 85 percent participation in the first year to 
                                                 
1 Note that our data are left censored. That is we do not have information about the case and case 
members before April 1993. Further, for these analyses, we do not make use of information 
preceding the start of the FIP program, October 1993.  
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participation between 26 and 30 percent of cases in the second year when there was no 
FIP participation. Note, however, that even with no FIP participation, up to 30 percent of 
the cases received food stamp assistance. 
The experience for those on FIP for all 24 months was very different. These cases 
had lower employment rates, although even during the first year between 63 and 69 
percent of cases had some wage income. The lowest labor force participation rates were 
reported in metro areas. Employment rates rose in the second year, with the most rapid 
increases occurring in metro and urban locations. The number of quarters worked also 
increased for these households. The annual wage income increased, however the increase 
was both at a level and growth rate lower than for those who were off of FIP by the 
second year. The lowest wage income was reported in metro areas. 
Rates of child support for the hard core FIP cases increased as well in all areas. 
The annual levels of child support received were greatest in rural areas. Food stamp 
assistance was relatively common, and the highest food stamp participation rates 
occurred in metro counties (with rates of 92 to 93 percent). 
In sum, in all geographic areas, there were changes in labor market activity for all 
FIP households during the two-year period: the average number of quarters worked 
increased for all groups; for those with no months on FIP in the second year, the 
percentage with employment fell. Increased work by the hard-core (24 months on FIP) 
may be attributed to success in meeting FIPs program goals. In comparing across 
geographic areas, the lower level of wage income and child support in metro areas is 
striking, especially compared with the two rural locations. Among those on FIP for the 
full 24 months, those in metro areas received the lowest wage income and near the lowest 
levels of child support. Growth rates for both wages and child support were higher for 
those in the two rural areas. 
 
Empirical Analysis of Welfare Recidivism 
We next examine recidivism through the duration of the first exit spell. We discuss 
the methods of analysis in detail in the following subsections. 
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Definitions of Variables  
We analyze the first exit spell to gain a better understanding of welfare recidivism. 
An exit is said to occur when a FIP recipient leaves the program for at least two 
consecutive months. Hence, an exit spell ranges between 2 and 23 months in our data. 
We require two consecutive months with $0 in FIP benefits to avoid problems with 
individuals counted as an exit due to administrative delays, or due to an individual not 
receiving a benefit in the short term to reasons of being eligible for a benefit of less than 
$10, for example.2 If the first exit spell of a case lasts only for a single month, we choose 
the next valid exit spell. There are 18,382 exit spells in our sample of 32,309 cases (Table 
6). The distribution of spells for the metro and nonmetro areas are similar. Twenty-five 
percent of the exit spells are complete before the end of our sample period; the remaining 
spells are right-censored. The average length of all exit spells is 11 months. The average 
length of the complete spell, however, is six months, which suggests that for those who 
returned to FIP, the duration of their exit spell is relatively short. 
 
Estimation Procedure 
A semiparametric proportional hazard model with time-varying covariates is applied 
to our grouped duration data (Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978; Kiefer, 1990). The advantage 
of the semiparametric method is that the baseline hazard is nonparametric and is 
estimated along with the coefficients of the explanatory variables through a maximum 
likelihood procedure. 
We grouped the exit spells by duration into eight mutually exclusive time intervals. 
That is, reentry occurs in one of the following intervals [0, 4), [4, 7),, [22, ∞), where a 
month is the unit of the measurement. The exit intervals are defined as [0, a1), [a1, a2),, 
[ai, ∞). The probability of an exit spell ending in interval i is equivalent to the probability 
that a spell survives to interval i-1 and fails in interval i. Hence, the probability is given 
by 
                                                 
2 Program rules are such that a FIP program participant eligible for a cash benefit of less than $10 in a 
given month does not receive a cash benefit that month, but continues to remain eligible for, and must 
participate in, all other aspects of the program as if she/he had received a cash benefit. 
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where j= 1,,7. 
We treat survival or failure (reentry) in each time interval as an observation. As a 
result, each FIP case contributes i observations to the likelihood function where i is the 
interval in which reentry takes place. For exit spells censored in a given interval, we 
assume that censoring occurs at the beginning of the interval. Given a sample with n 
individuals, the likelihood function is given as 
,P)P(1)θ(
n
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d
a jik∏ ∏
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−=L  
where d=0 if the individual is still at risk and d=1 if reentry occurs. 
To estimate the likelihood function, we use a proportional hazard function λ(t,Xt) = 
λ0(t)φ(β,Xt) where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard function,  φ(β,Xt) = exp(βXt), and Xt is a 
set of regressors. Instead of specifying the functional form for the baseline hazard, the 
semiparametric method estimates the baseline hazard function for each time interval. The 
resulting log likelihood function can be rewritten as follows: 
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δi is the conditional survival probability in interval i when βXi is equal to zero. 
Our model allows the values of the time-varying covariates to vary across different 
time intervals but requires them to remain constant within the time interval. The time-
varying covariates include quarterly potential wage, quarterly child support collections, 
marital status, number of children, an indicator of the food stamp participation in the 
previous quarter, an indicator of the area of residence (metro county vs. nonmetro 
county), and the quarterly local unemployment rate. Time invariant variables are gender 
and race (white or nonwhite). 
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Because wage income is an important predictor of FIP participation, and because 
decisions regarding labor force and FIP participation are jointly determined, we use an 
instrumental variable approach to control for the endogeneity. The observed wage income 
in the quarter with highest reported wage income was used in predicting the potential 
wage income. The instruments for the potential wage include age, education, local 
unemployment rate, quarter, gender, income per capita of the county of residence, share 
of county population with a college degree, and an indicator of residing in a metro 
county. 
 
Empirical Results 
The descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis are given in Table 7. Note, 
because the values of several of the variables change during the exit spell, the means are 
provided in Table 7 for the first quarter of the exit spell only. We note that the magnitude 
of the predicted potential wage is relatively high, a result that may be due to the choice of 
the quarter of highest wage income for the prediction. The estimated coefficients of the 
duration model are reported in Table 8. 
We identify several important factors affecting FIP reentry. Results are presented for 
all cases, as well as metro and nonmetro cases. Most of the estimated coefficients are 
similar across the two geographic areas, except for those of demographics (marital status 
and gender), local unemployment and for the potential wage. With the data combined, 
living in a metro county decreases the reentry hazard, although this result is not 
statistically significant. 
For all areas, higher quarterly wage income reduces the reentry hazard. This result is 
statistically significant for all cases and for nonmetro. Child support is negatively related 
to the probability of reentering FIP in a given interval. The magnitude of the coefficients 
indicates greater relative importance to increases in child support compared to wage 
income. The hypothesis that a higher (current) unemployment rate increases the 
probability of reentry is not supported here. Lagged unemployment rates produced 
similar results. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant only for nonmetro 
areas. 
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Receipt of food stamps in the previous quarter is positively associated with return to 
FIP. This result is consistent with that found by Reidy in Illinois. Those who continue to 
receive some form of assistance are more likely to return to FIP. The result suggests that 
the FSP provides a safety net for those most at risk of return to FIP. 
Being married decreases the likelihood of returning to FIP in metro areas; the effect 
is not statistically significant in nonmetro areas. Male-headed cases are less likely to 
return to FIP than female-headed cases, and this effect is stronger in metro than in 
nonmetro areas. Race does not affect the reentry rates. Families with a greater number of 
children are more likely to return to welfare. 
The estimated coefficients R1 to R7 in Table 8 are used to calculate the hazard rate. 
Figure 2 shows the shape of the reentry (hazard) rate, which is estimated at the sample 
means of the explanatory variables. The hazard rate decreases almost monotonically as 
the exit spell lengthens, confirming the existence of negative duration dependence. In the 
first quarter, the hazard rate is 0.093 in metro areas and 0.101 in nonmetro areas. By the 
end of the sixth quarter, the hazard rate decreases to 0.029 for metro areas and 0.030 in 
nonmetro cases. The hazard rate falls throughout the spell (except the last quarter). 
Although the rates differ in the first quarters where metro cases are more likely to return 
than those in nonmetro areas, for longer spells, the hazard rates of return are very similar. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
We examined the dynamics of welfare participation and the initial experience of 
welfare reforms in Iowa. Over 60 percent of the FIP recipients we followed in this study 
left the program at some point during this two-year period. Although improvements in the 
Iowa economy account for a share of the exits, our results provide some evidence that 
Iowas reform of its welfare program may have helped reduce the FIP caseloads, as well. 
There are differences, too, between the experience of those in metro and nonmetro areas. 
Analysis of FIP participants shows that between the first quarter and the last quarter 
during the period observed, there were marked economic improvements for some of the 
households. The employment situation for many in nonmetro areas shows higher wage 
earnings. Food assistance programs continued to offer assistance to these households, and 
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seemed especially important during periods of transition. However, many with support 
from the FSP returned. There was a relatively high degree of mobility among FIP 
participants, especially for those in nonmetro areas. The moves were not primarily 
associated with concurrent moving from being an active FIP participant. 
What is most apparent, though, is that some households are able to move off of FIP, 
and others experience great difficulties in achieving self-sufficiency. Thirty-seven percent 
of FIP cases in our data stayed on FIP for the full two years. Several indicators suggest 
that those in metro areas in Iowa were more dependent on FIP sources of income: they 
were less likely to obtain wage earnings or child support and received lower wage 
earnings and lower child support amounts. Under TANF, the five-year lifetime limit on 
receiving benefits may affect this group most directly. They may be without assistance if 
state governments can exempt only 20 percent of their caseloads from the time limit. 
The average length of a completed exit spell is six months, implying that FIP 
recipients who returned to the program did so quickly. Our data show that among FIP 
recipients, those in metro areas are less likely to leave FIP compared with those in 
nonmetro areas, but once they leave, those who left in metro areas are less likely to return 
right away. The multivariate analysis of likelihood of return to FIP after leaving shows 
that after the first two quarters, there is little difference in the likelihood of returning 
between metro and nonmetro locations. 
The reasons for the differences (and similarities) are likely to be complex and we are 
only beginning to understand the experience of those who leave FIP (and the FSP) 
through closer examination of administrative data, as well as survey data on leavers. 
Characteristics of the leavers may differ across the geographic areas. Perhaps metro 
recipients do not leave FIP until they have very good economic prospects. Once off FIP, 
they stay off longer and are less likely to return immediately. There may be also 
differences in non-participation among eligibles, and the administrative data can provide 
only very limited evidence of this. 
The lessons learned here provide a preliminary indication of what we can expect 
from a state TANF program. Iowas experience suggests that human capital, marriage, 
child support, and the presence of children are major determinants of welfare dependence 
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and recidivism. Food assistance programs provide significant support to those most at 
economic risk. Programs and policies designed to enhance education, encourage 
marriage, provide and impose job training and job search, and further enforce the support 
of children by non-custodial parents are likely to be most effective in helping families 
achieve economic self-sufficiency, in either metro or nonmetro areas. 
The empirical analyses for this study were conducted using state administrative data. 
Having the opportunity to use administrative data for research is a mixed blessing. These 
data allowed for analyses that could not have been conducted with survey data. On the 
other hand, they have their own challenges and limitations relative to survey data that 
cannot be ignored. We addressed one of these challenges in detail in another study: the 
problem of missing data for a key explanatory variable (educational attainment). In this 
paper we took advantage of the ability to track location change and the dynamics of 
active program participation. Based on our experiences with these data for this and other 
studies, we find that research based on administrative data complements well traditional 
survey-based research and should be encouraged. 
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Table 1. FIP caseloads by demographic variables: October 1993 
    
Demographic Variables Total Metro Nonmetro 
Total Caseload-- 
  Active in October 1993 
32,309 17,159 15,150 
 Percent on Food Stamp Program 89% 90% 87% 
 Number of Children 2.2 2.2 2.1 
 Area of Residence    
    Living in Metro 53.1%   
    Living in Urban Nonmetro 16.9%   
    Living in Rural Adjacent 13.7%   
    Living in Rural Nonadjacent 16.3%   
 Earnings and Child Support    
    Family Had Wage Earnings 55% 52% 58% 
    Family Received Child Support 29% 26% 32% 
 Number of Adults    
    No Adult 1% 1% 0.7% 
    One Adult Case 46% 52% 40% 
    Two Adults Case 34% 31% 38% 
    More Than Two Adults Case 19% 16% 21% 
 Married 20% 15% 24% 
 Gender    
    Male 9% 8% 11% 
    Female 91% 92% 89% 
 Ethnicity    
    White 85% 76% 94% 
    Black 12% 20% 3% 
    Others 3% 4% 3% 
 Educational Attainment    
    High School, GED or More  61% 58% 64% 
    Less Than High School 39% 42% 36% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26  /  Jensen, Keng, and Garasky 
Table 2. Means and standard deviation of selected demographic variables for metro 
and nonmetro cases: December 1993 and September 1995 
 Metro Cases Nonmetro Cases 
Variables December 
1993 
September 
1995 
December 
1993 
September 
1995 
Quarterly Wage Income 
($) 
2781 
(2889)a 
3,575  
(3,299) 
3,223  
(3,154)a 
4,207 
 (3,706) 
Proportion with Quarterly 
Wage Income 
0.52 
(0.50) 
0.67 
 (0.47) 
0.58 
 (0.49) 
0.72 
 (0.45) 
Quarterly Child Support 
($) 
162 
(178) 
435 
 (596) 
166 
 (195) 
480 
 (634) 
Proportion with Quarterly 
Child Support 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.32  
(0.47) 
0.32  
(0.47) 
0.41  
(0.49) 
Proportion with High 
School Degree or Above 
0.58 
 (0.49) 
0.61  
(0.49) 
0.64  
(0.48) 
0.66  
(0.47) 
Proportion Married 0.15 
 (0.36) 
0.18  
(0.39) 
0.24  
(0.43) 
0.29  
(0.45) 
Number of Children 2.20 
 (1.33) 
2.31  
(1.37) 
2.14  
(1.25) 
2.23  
(1.29) 
Proportion Living in 
Metro Counties 
1.0 
 (0.0) 
0.97  
(0.18) 
0.0 
 (0.0) 
0.04  
(0.20) 
Local Unemployment 
Rate 
3.48  
(0.83) 
2.97  
(0.55) 
4.04  
(1.11) 
3.58  
(0.85) 
Proportion of FIP 
Participation 
0.92  
(0.27) 
0.51  
(0.49) 
0.91  
(0.28) 
0.49  
(0.50) 
Proportion Receiving 
Food Stamps 
0.86  
(0.35) 
0.57  
(0.50) 
0.82  
(0.38) 
0.53  
(0.50) 
Number of Observations 17,159 17,159 15,150 15,150 
a Standard deviation is in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Location and the Low Income Experience  /  27 
Table 3. Means and standard deviation of selected demographic variables for 
urban, rural-adjacent and rural-nonadjacent cases:  December 1993 and 
September 1995 
Urban Rural-adjacent Rural-nonadjacent  
Variables December 
1993 
September 
1995 
December 
1993 
September 
1995 
December 
1993 
September 
1995 
Quarterly 
Wage 
Income ($) 
3,124 
(3,146)a 
3,998 
(3,532) 
3,313 
(3,231)a 
4,361 
(3,865) 
3,242 
(3,092) 
4,290 
(3,732) 
Proportion 
with Quarterly 
Wage Income 
0.54 
 (0.50) 
0.71  
(0.45) 
0.60 
 (0.49) 
0.73 
 (0.44) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
0.72  
(0.45) 
Quarterly 
Child Support 
($) 
164 
 (190) 
444 
 (566) 
165 
 (157) 
492 
 (596) 
168 
 (225) 
503 
 (712) 
Proportion 
with Quarterly 
Child Support 
0.30  
(0.45) 
0.38  
(0.48) 
0.32  
(0.47) 
0.39  
(0.49) 
0.35  
(0.48) 
0.45  
(0.50) 
Proportion 
with High 
School Degree 
or Above 
 
0.61  
(0.49) 
 
0.63  
(0.48) 
 
0.65  
(0.48) 
 
0.67  
(0.47) 
 
0.66  
(0.47) 
 
0.69  
(0.46) 
Proportion 
Married 
0.23  
(0.42) 
0.28  
(0.45) 
0.25  
(0.43) 
0.30  
(0.46) 
0.25  
(0.43) 
0.29  
(0.46) 
Number of 
Children 
2.13  
(1.25) 
2.23  
(1.31) 
2.14  
(1.26) 
2.24  
(1.31) 
2.15  
(1.23) 
2.21  
(1.26) 
Proportion 
Living in 
Metro 
Counties 
 
0.0 
 (0.0) 
 
0.03  
(0.17) 
 
0.0 
 (0.0) 
 
0.07  
(0.25) 
 
0.0 
(0.0) 
 
0.03  
(0.17) 
Local 
Unemployment 
Rate 
4.38  
(0.82) 
3.91  
(0.86) 
3.86  
(1.05) 
3.33 
 (0.74 
3.84  
(1.34) 
3.45  
(0.82) 
Proportion of 
FIP 
0.92  
(0.27) 
0.51  
(0.50) 
0.90  
(0.30) 
0.47  
(0.50) 
0.91  
(0.28) 
0.47  
(0.50) 
Participation 
Percent 
Receiving 
Food Stamps 
 
0.85  
(0.35) 
 
0.57  
(0.49) 
 
0.79  
(0.40) 
 
0.50  
(0.50) 
 
0.81  
(0.39) 
 
0.51  
(0.50) 
Number of 
Observations 
5.472 5.472 4.427 4.427 5.251 5.251 
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Table 4. FIP status before and after moving to another county for movers:  
October 1993 to September 1995 
Before Moving to Another County After Moving to Another County  
Metro moves (n = 1,629)a Active 
 
Inactive Total 
Active 69.23 (59.5) 30.77 (7.58) (19.15) 
Inactive 11.16 (40.5) 88.84 (92.42) (80.85) 
Total 22.28 77.72 100.00 
Before Moving to Another County After Moving to Another County  
Nonmetro moves (n = 3,439) Active 
 
Inactive Total 
Active 63.62 (61.85) 36.38 (9.95) (21.34) 
Inactive 10.65 (38.15) 89.35 (90.05) (78.66) 
Total 21.95 78.05 100.00 
Column percentages are in parentheses. 
a Note that n represents the number of moves and not number of movers. 
 
  
Table 5. Comparison of selected demographic variables among five dynamic participation patterns:  
October 1993 to September 1995 (October 1993 base year) 
 Metro Metro Urban  Urban  
Variables 0 Months in 2nd Year 
N=4,183 
(24.4%) 
24 Months in 2 years 
N=6,541 
(38.1%) 
0 Months in 2nd Year 
N=1,356 
(24.8%) 
24 Months in 2 Years 
N=2,035 
(37.2%) 
 Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Growth 
Rate 
Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Growth 
Rate 
Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Growth 
Rate 
Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Growth 
Rate 
Annual Wage Income  
($) 
10,478 14,665 40.0 7,671 8,504 11.6 11,317 16,119 42.4 9,148 10,070 10.1 
Proportion Employed 0.79 0.74 -5.5 0.63 0.74 16.4 0.79 0.78 -1.4 0.66 0.77 16.2 
Annual Child Support 
($) 
1,323 2,279 72.3 377 394 4.5 1,419 2,381 67.8 372 391 5.1 
Proportion Having 
Child Support 
0.42 0.43 2.7 0.38 0.40 6.1 0.48 0.51 5.9 42.9 47.7 10.7 
Proportion with Food 
Stamps 
0.88 0.26 -70.0 0.93 0.92 -0.2 0.88 0.28 -
68.0 
0.935 0.938 0.4 
Number of Children 2.04 2.04 0.01 2.33 2.44 4.5 2.01 2.01 0.1 2.22 2.32 4.6 
Proportion High 
School or Abovea 
0.61 0.63 3.7 0.56 0.58 4.0 0.65 0.67 3.4 0.60 0.61 3.2 
Proportion Married 0.19 0.20 6.9 0.132 0.13 0.7 0.23 0.25 5.7 0.217 0.22 1.6 
Quarters Worked 2.50 2.62 4.6 1.85 2.24 21.4 2.53 2.77 9.6 1.95 2.38 21.6 
Unemployment Rate 3.55 3.19 -10.2 3.67 3.29 -10.4 4.54 4.15 -8.7 4.53 4.15 -8.3 
Proportion with Move 
to Another County 
0.03   0.03   0.05   0.05   
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 Table 5. Continued 
 Rural Adjacent Rural Adjacent Rural Non-Adjacent Rural Non-Adjacent 
Variables 0 Months in 2nd Year 
N=1,218 
(27.5%) 
24 Months in 2 Years 
N=1,506 
(34.0%) 
0 Months in 2nd Year 
N=1,420 
(27.0%) 
24 Months in 2 Years 
N=1,760 
(33.5%) 
 Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Growth 
Rate 
Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Growth 
Rate 
Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Growth 
Rate 
Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Growth 
Rate 
Annual Wage Income  
($) 
13,033 17,758 36.3 9,796 11,176 14.1 12,578 17,487 39.0 9,369 10,771 15.0 
Proportion Employed 0.84 0.81 -3.9 0.69 0.76 9.4 0.82 0.78 -4.3 0.68 0.75 9.8 
Annual Child Support 
($) 
1,430 2,462 72.1 389 418 7.5 1,409 2,521 78.9 386 421 9.1 
Proportion Having 
Child Support 
0.47 0.49 3.9 0.46 0.47 3.5 0.548 0.55 1.0 0.47 0.51 6.8 
Proportion with Food 
Stamp 
0.86 0.30 -65.3 0.869 0.866 -0.3 0.85 0.28 -66.7 0.89 0.88 -1.1 
Number of Children 2.07 2.10 1.1 2.18 2.27 4.1 2.05 2.04 -0.1 2.20 2.27 3.4 
Proportion with High 
School or Abovea 
0.68 0.70 2.2 0.62 0.65 4.2 0.70 0.71 2.2 0.66 0.68 3.6 
Proportion Married 0.28 0.29 2.9 0.24 0.24 0.6 0.25 0.26 3.7 0.24 0.24 0.0 
Quarters Worked 2.79 2.93 4.8 2.12 2.43 14.9 2.69 2.81 4.1 2.07 2.39 15.5 
Unemployment Rate 4.10 3.84 -6.3 4.26 3.94 -6.7 4.14 3.87 -6.4 4.28 3.97 -7.4 
Proportion with Move 
to Another County 
0.09   0.10   0.10   0.10   
a The average of five imputation data sets is reported. 
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Table 6. Distribution of exit spells: October 1993 to September 1995 
Duration All Spells Complete Spells Right-censored Spells 
  
Obs 
Food 
Stamp 
(%) 
 
Obs 
Food 
Stamp 
(%) 
 
Obs 
Food 
Stamp 
(%) 
2 1,596 41 963 (60)a 41 633 (40) 40 
3 1,427 45 731 (51) 44 696 (49) 45 
4 1,143 42 482 (42) 40 661 (58) 43 
5 963 41 439 (46) 37 524 (54) 45 
6 926 47 382 (41) 45 544 (59) 48 
7 805 43 313 (39) 49 492 (61) 40 
8 750 40 263 (35) 38 487 (65) 41 
9 806 44 168 (21) 37 638 (79) 46 
10 711 41 142 (20) 44 569 (80) 40 
11 766 41 127 (17) 41 639 (83) 41 
12 863 38 120 (14) 37 743 (86) 39 
13 772 29 97 (13) 42 675 (87) 27 
14 732 31 87 (12) 38 645 (88) 30 
15 743 35 64 (9) 41 679 (91) 34 
16 714 33 42 (6) 38 672 (94) 32 
17 605 34 39 (6) 44 566 (94) 33 
18 636 36 33 (5) 30 603 (95) 36 
19 587 34 27 (5) 30 560 (95) 34 
20 615 30 20 (3) 25 595 (97) 30 
21 751 33 18 (2) 33 733 (98) 33 
22 746 29   6 (1) 50 740 (99) 29 
23 725 26   725 (100) 26 
Mean       11.10 6.00 12.78 
Spells    18,382 4,563 13,819 
a Row percentages are in parentheses 
Note: Food stamp percentage is computed according to the food stamp status in the first 
month of the exit. 
.
 Table 7. Definitions, means, and standard errors of variables 
Mean (Standard Error) Variable 
All 
Cases 
Metro 
Cases 
Nonmetro 
Cases 
Definition 
Male 0.1  
(0.30) 
0.09  
(0.29) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if FIP recipient is male 
White 0.86  
(0.35) 
0.78  
(0.41) 
0.95 
(0.22) 
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if FIP recipient is white 
Potential Wage 6.15 
(0.81)a 
6.12 
(0.81)a 
6.18 
(0.82)a 
Predicted quarterly wage income (thousand) in the first 
quarter of the exit spell 
Child Support 0.277 
(0.97) 
0.24 
(0.50) 
0.32 
(0.79) 
Quarterly child support collections (thousand) in the first 
quarter of the exit spell 
Local Unemployment 
Rate 
3.80  
(1.14) 
3.41  
(0.83) 
4.21 
(1.27) 
Quarterly average local unemployment rate (percent) in 
the first quarter of the exit spell 
Number of Children 2.15 
(1.26) 
2.16 
(1.29) 
2.14 
(1.23) 
Number of children in the first quarter of the exit spell 
Married 0.24 
(0.43) 
0.19 
(0.39) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if married in the first 
quarter of the exit spell 
Receipt of Food Stamps 0.44 
(0.50) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.44 
(0.49) 
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if received food stamp in 
the first quarter of the exit spell 
Metro 0.52 
(0.50) 
1.00 
(0.0) 
0.0 
(0.0) 
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if lived in metro counties 
in the first quarter of the exit spell 
a The average of five imputation data sets is reported. 
Note: Means are provided for the first quarter of the exit spell only where the variable changes during the exit spell. 
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Table 8: Average maximum likelihood estimates of recidivism:  
October 1993 to September 1995a 
Independent Variables All Cases Metro Cases Nonmetro Cases 
Potential (Predicted) Wage -0.06** -0.04 -0.07** 
Child Support  -0.52*** -0.55*** -0.49*** 
Local Unemployment Rate -0.02 0.03 -0.04** 
Receipt of Food Stamps (0,1) 0.61*** 0.62** 0.60** 
White (0,1) 0.02 0.0003 0.12 
Married (0,1) -0.02 -0.13** 0.06 
Male (0,1) -0.16*** -0.23** -0.11* 
Number of Children 0.10*** 0.089*** 0.10*** 
Metro Location -0.06   
Other Parameters Estimated    
  R7 -2.78*** -3.0*** -2.77*** 
  R6 -3.10*** -3.35*** -3.06*** 
  R5 -2.81*** -3.15*** -2.68*** 
  R4 -2.73*** -2.93*** -2.75*** 
  R3 -2.40*** -2.66*** -2.37*** 
  R2 -2.17*** -2.46*** -2.09*** 
  R1 -2.42*** -2.73*** -2.33*** 
Number of Observations 18,382 9,492 8,890 
Log Likelihoodb -15,592.94 -7,915.97 -7665.08 
*** significant at 1 percent level. 
 ** significant at 5 percent level. 
  * significant at 10 percent level. 
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    Figure 2. Predicted hazard rate evaluated at the sample means by county of residence 
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